The MCB’s missed opportunities and the path forward

Introduction

In private conversations with fellow British Muslims, I often encounter a prevailing sense of disillusionment with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). Established in 1997, and now with, reportedly, 500 affiliates, the MCB is the biggest British Muslim representative body. Over the last decade, for various reasons, the MCB has not been seen as a viable partner for engagement by public institutions and successive governments. This lack of engagement has drastically curtailed the MCB’s ability to be present in national conversations. Against this backdrop, every two years, the MCB holds leadership elections from its member/executive base. The tenure of the previous Secretary General, Zara Mohammed, who was the first female to hold the position, was arguably a missed opportunity to revitalise the organisation. Some of the work done by the MCB under Zara’s leadership, such as during COVID-19 and in partnership with BIMA, has been brilliant. However, beyond that, the MCB has largely been ineffective in my view. In a 2021 article (How the MCB can uplift the fate of British Muslims), I outlined strategic steps the MCB could take to renew its relevance and impact. Regrettably, the issues I raised then remained unresolved during Zara’s tenure:

The MCB hasn’t yet adopted a God-centric understanding of what it means to be “Muslim” and made this a guiding principle of its polity, nor has it created a framework to navigate between spiritual identity and sociocultural identification. Instead, it continues to conflate a theological identity with an ethnographic label.
The MCB hasn’t yet embraced non-partisanship, and has, at times, resorted to harsh attacks on political figures like Kemi Badenoch and Nigel Farage, targeting individuals for ideological differences rather than engaging critically in the marketplace of ideas.
The MCB hasn’t yet distanced itself from identity politics nor developed the tools and language to handle it constructively.
The MCB hasn’t yet created a serious, achievable, long-term strategic development plan for British Muslims, one grounded in an overarching vision, needs, and measurable outcomes.

In January 2025, the election of a new leader, Dr Mohammed Wajid Akhter, has brought a noticeable change in tempo for the MCB. However, after several months of observation, I’m afraid, while the work on the ground seems fresh and energetic at first glance, a closer look reveals that it has a lot of work to do still. At the core of this is a deeper problem: the articulation and structuring of the problems the MCB seeks to resolve remain either flawed or unclear.

Dr Akhter, a GP, campaigned on a platform of modernisation and institutional overhaul. He launched an ambitious “Vision 2050” agenda and pledged a comprehensive “open‑heart surgery” of the organisation to better unite and serve British Muslim communities.

While I applaud this recognition and intent, any meaningful strategic planning process by the MCB must begin with a thorough, honest assessment of itself, the needs and challenges of British Muslims, and the dynamics of the external environment. This demands a fair, balanced approach, undertaken with conscious efforts to recognise and correct for bias. But while this “open-heart surgery” process in ongoing, it is a little premature, and, as some might argue somewhat self-aggrandising, of the MCB to constantly assert itself as the de-facto representative body for British Muslims and expect others to engage with them on that basis.

A recurring narrative within some activist British Muslims circles portrays the community as uniformly oppressed and powerless. While this framing generates solidarity, it distracts from more productive strategies that foster agency, resilience, and long-term impact. Unfortunately, the MCB’s public communication often seem to reinforce this outlook. Frequently reactive and hard-hearted in tone, shaped more by grievance, and lacking emotional composure and nuance in addressing complex socio-political issues. In truth, large segments of British Muslims are remarkably upwardly socially mobile and successful, with progress accelerating across all sectors. According to the IIFL’s 2024 study, 86% of British Muslims say the UK is a place to thrive, vs. 70% of the general population. There is a plethora of stats across educational attainment (e.g. 50% of British Bangladeshis second generation with university degrees vs 31% of white peers), economic impact and entrepreneurialism and culture that further substantiates this.

While there is a lot more to do and potential that remains unlocked, the progress thus far has been made possible not only through the hard work, sacrifice and resilience of British Muslims as individuals and in small pockets of communities, but also, due to the policies of successive governments, and opportunities afforded by life in the UK. Notably, this progress has occurred without any MCB involvement or visible advocacy, raising questions about its relevance and value as a representative body in the British public realm.

In this paper I offer a principled and constructive critique of the MCB, and argue that the organisation’s current posture, messaging, and strategy remain misaligned with the evolving needs of British Muslims and the wider society. Drawing on Islamic principles, public leadership theory, and socio-political insight, I present six recommendations for the MCB to reposition itself as a credible, solution-oriented and spiritually grounded representative body.

I have not written this paper with the intention to antagonise, but, rather, with sincere concern and hope that the MCB can play a transformative role. If its leadership embraces internal reflection, recalibrates its approach, and commits to strategic development rooted in integrity, the MCB can yet become a powerful voice for British Muslims and a partner in national progress. If it does not, it risks irrelevance and inadvertently harming the very communities it seeks to serve, which many already perceive them to have done for over a decade.

Advice 1: From populism to principle – replace reactive, grievance-led messaging with wisdom, humility, and strategic tone-setting

If the MCB is to move beyond its current reactive, populist tone and instead embody wisdom and principled leadership, it must undertake a serious cultural and strategic transformation. This shift requires rethinking not just what the MCB says, but how and why it says what it says by incorporating sound judgement and a mature understanding of Britain’s diverse public policy landscape. This may well require a complete overhaul of its brand guidelines.

First and foremost, though, the MCB must ground its public discourse and posture in God-consciousness (taqwa). Its statements and initiatives should reflect prophetic qualities, truthfulness, humility, compassion, rather than political convenience or crowd-pleasing rhetoric. It must get away from point scoring. Too often the MCB talks about justice/injustice in a harsh tone, with little consideration for how its message is received by wide society. This disregard for emotional and psychological nuance weakens its message and alienates potential allies rather helping win hearts and minds. The corpus of Islamic thought exists because truth without wisdom can become a weapon rather than a guide. Even justice must be spoken with the intention to heal, not to humiliate.

What I am suggesting shouldn’t come as a surprise:

God reminds Muslims in the Qur’an, “Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and gentle exhortation” (16:125), emphasising emotional intelligence and tact in persuasion.
God also praises the Prophet’s mildness: “Had you been harsh and hard‑hearted, they would have scattered from around you” (3:159). A representative Muslim body must model this prophetic wisdom in its tone and strategy.
True commitment to justice also means applying it impartially, as God commands, “Believers, stand firmly for justice, as witnesses for God, even if it is against yourselves, your parents, or your kin” (4:135). In other words, being willing to confront one’s own shortcomings (the MCB’s and those it represents) and not just the faults of others (Government, right wing press, anti-immigration proponents, Nigel Farage, white British etc.)

A good recent example was Dr Akhter’s call to action on a LinkedIn video post relating to the Government’s attempt to define Islamophobia/Anti-Muslim Hatred. It’s something I have extensively written about in 2018 and in 2025, and others have critiqued what I have written (Why is Islamophobia so hard to define).

Dr Akhter said on 4^th July 2025:

“Brothers and sisters you don’t need someone to define Islamophobia, you’ve experienced it throughout your life. You are seeing it on your phone, taking place in the genocide of Gaza, this is the 30^th anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica, every single time you go online, you’ve experienced Islamophobia, so we don’t need someone to define it for us because we know it, we feel it and no Muslim of this country has not been a victim of Islamophobia at some point in their life if not in the last week. But if you don’t take part in this consultation, if you don’t fill it out, if you don’t give your views, if you don’t get your mosque or your local organisation do so as well, then the definition of Islamophobia will be decided by others and maybe even by those people who have built their entire career by being Islamophobic. So please make sure you fill out the consultation. Make sure you tell them how you feel, follow our guidance and template and ensure that Islamophobia is not defined without us.”

I will break this down to show how it raises concerns regarding the credibility, tone, and strategic positioning of the MCB as a serious and constructive representative body in British public life.

The tone is too emotive and lacks nuance undermining the MCB’s positioning as a mature, strategic organisation. “We don’t need someone to define it for us because we know it” eschews clarity in favour of emotional resonance, which may work in activist circles and recognises the emotion-driven reality of many British Muslims, but lacks the analytical rigour expected of a representative body. Ironically, the statement contradicts itself. “We don’t need someone to define it… But if you don’t take part… the definition will be decided by others” begins by declaring a definition of Islamophobia unnecessary because “we feel it,” then urges participation in a consultation to help define it.

It situates massacres in Gaza and Srebrenica as proximally relevant to the UK’s search for a definition. But linking a UK government consultation to genocides is a false equivalence (it trivialises the latter and inflates the former beyond its scope). Such framing undermines the nuance necessary for effective policy engagement and alienates potential allies who might be happy to acknowledge the need to address Islamophobia/anti-Muslim hatred but cannot support false equivalences. A credible organisation must show that it understands context-specific responses. By blurring contexts, the MCB appears reactionary and uncalibrated. The MCB needs to speak consistently with measured wisdom, and emotional composure, not rhetorical devices.

Statements like “No Muslim of this country has not been a victim of Islamophobia… if not in their last week” are sweeping generalisations that are empirically unverifiable and sound alarmist. Many British Muslims report highly positive, integrated and successful experiences in British society. Survey data for Islamophobic experiences varies significantly, ranging from 69% (in a 2023 survey) to 27% (in 2024). These numbers, though concerning, don’t in my view justify the assertion that all Muslims are constantly affected. Moreover, studies into the experience of microaggressions in workplaces, show that even 47% of white British individuals experience microaggression or discriminatory behaviour. This suggests that Islamophobia exists within a broader context of societal behaviour of intolerance, exclusion and uncaring attitudes. Moreover, painting the entire British Muslim population as perpetual victims erases the diversity of their lived experiences, and undermines the MCB’s credibility to offer pragmatic, meaningful, solution-orientated insights. I would also argue that it is also quite damaging to the cause because it reinforces a disempowering narrative of grievance, which is neither politically effective nor grounded in Islamic theology.

Combative phrases like: “…maybe even by those people who have built their entire career by being Islamophobic” risk reinforcing the adversarial “us versus them” binary, that alienates rather than builds alliances. It’s also misleading. The Government’s Working Group on the Definition of Islamophobia/Anti-Muslim Hatred is made up of individuals with integrity, a strong record of advocacy on social issues, and broad respect across political lines. Except the chair, Dominic Grieve KC, all members are Muslim. And even Grieve KC, a former Attorney General, is well-known for supporting social causes and is close to the former MCB Secretary General Dr Abdul Bari.

The statement misses an opportunity to remind Muslims of the Islamic principle of seeking consultation with subject matter experts, and to mutually collaborate with others for productive outcomes. Did not God say: “…consult among yourselves..” (Qur’an, 42:38)? The Prophetic model of public engagement is to show maturity (e.g. by acknowledging complexity) and being prepared to address issues separately when working with potentially competing perspectives. The absence of “usuli” (principles) depth in the MCB as a representative body is notable here.

Lastly, the encouragement to use the MCB’s template for submitting consultation responses bears the hallmarks of a crowd-pleasing, mass mobilisation campaign rather than thoughtful engagement. While the intention may be to facilitate broader participation, this approach prioritises quantity over quality and risks undermining the seriousness of the consultation process. By encouraging mass, uniform responses, the MCB inadvertently promotes a culture where the loudest or most numerous voices dominate, not necessarily the most thoughtful or constructive ones. This often reduces complex policy engagement to a numbers game, rather than fostering meaningful dialogue or nuanced contributions. True engagement requires depth, diversity of thought, and careful reflection, not a cut-and-paste mobilisation effort that may be perceived as performative rather than persuasive.

The point of my critique above is to show how the MCB as an organisation can inadvertently harm British Muslims and Islam.

I would argue that a return to the Islamic intellectual spiritual tradition can guide the MCB in a more effective direction. Simply aligning with basic foundational usul as guiding principles for the MCB would be step in the right direction. For example, the MCB should ask itself: “How is the MCB’s position sincerely rooted in God-consciousness?” The operative word is “how.” Approaches like fiqh al-aqalliyyat (jurisprudence for Muslim minorities), maqasid al-shari’ah, (the higher objectives of Islamic law, which would call for communication strategies that educate rather than inflame), and the Prophet’s example in engaging with dissenters offer a principled framework for navigating the public sphere. This would move the MCB away from reactionary posturing and toward leadership rooted in integrity.

This shift also requires building an independent intellectual framework rooted in Islamic thought and values, contextual awareness, and deeper systems thinking, not populist rhetoric. Activist and affiliate feedback alone are insufficient; theologians, scholars, and critical Muslim thinkers must guide this direction.

Internally, the MCB needs to reform its institutional culture. It should actively create space for feedback and critical reflection, welcoming divergent voices rather than insulating itself within an echo chamber. Engaging a broader range of professionals, such as academics, community leaders, thinkers, and people with different perspectives can sharpen the MCB’s strategic thinking. The ultimate measure of success should not be popularity with affiliates, but principled alignment and strategic clarity.

Public engagement communication strategy must also be handled with greater care. Instead of responding to events with blunt outrage or populist language, the MCB should strive for emotional composure and well-reasoned, hearts-and-mind messaging. Quick reactions and adversarial messaging should be abandoned completely. Leaders must be trained not only in media engagement, but in Islamic literacy, critical thinking, moral reasoning, civic responsibility etc. The MCB should avoid forming alliances with polarising or populist Muslim figures and organisations, and instead maintain principled independence. Engagement with wider society, especially with political parties, must be undertaken respectfully and constructively, especially when disagreements exist.

Finally, the MCB must project a constructive vision of British Muslim life. While challenges exist, there are also tremendous success stories across the community. Celebrating the tremendous social mobility, resilience, and contribution of British Muslims can shift public perception and internal morale. By presenting Muslims as partners in national renewal, rather than as perpetual outsiders, the MCB can frame issues as shared societal challenges, not as a binary “us versus them” interaction.

Advice 2: Don’t pick fights with everyone – it is hugely counterproductive and needless

When the British Muslim Network (BMN) launched, the MCB perceive it as a threat, prompting Dr Akhter to take to the airwaves to assert that only the MCB holds a legitimate affiliate mandate. But how can this kind of territorial mindset ever foster the unity the MCB claims to champion? As far as I know, no official MCB rep was there at the launch event. At a time when British Muslims need both convergent and divergent thinking and initiatives, the emergence of a new organisation focused on shared goals should have been welcomed, not resisted.

The MCB cannot realistically expect to unify all British Muslims under its leadership or umbrella. While the organisation consistently maintains that it represents only its affiliates, the frequent and broad use of the term “British Muslim” in its communications (which ofcourse one cannot linguistically get away from) can inadvertently give the impression, especially to outside observers, that it speaks on behalf of all British Muslims. This perception is problematic. In liberal democracies like the UK, it leaves the MCB open to criticism, particularly around ideological leanings, including historical associations with Islamist movements. These concerns, however contested, are not trivial. They continue to be raised by influential individuals and institutions across British public life. I recognise that this may be an uncomfortable point, but it underscores a critical reputational challenge: the perception of gatekeeping, which many see as a barrier to broader legitimacy and trust.

Given the diverse make-up, ethnic (Pakistani, Bengali, Indian, Afghan, Turkish, Somali etc.), sectarian (Deobandi, Barelwi, Salafi, Shi’ah etc.), intergenerational, and political affiliation, of British Muslims, one must ask: unity for what purpose? If “unity” is vaguely defined as “strength in numbers” or merely “symbolic collectivity” one must ask: what is this unity for? And more crucially: who is this unity aimed against? When unity becomes a political shield, rather than spiritually grounded in the path to God, it starts to resemble partisanship or tribalism, something that the Prophet explicitly warned against.

Today, many vocal and popular activist Muslim organisations cloak “unity” in the garb of tribalism, fostering a divisive “us versus them” narrative. I am not suggesting that the MCB has become one of these activist groups, but there is a real risk that it is perceived as such or closely associated with them. For me, there is a current within British Muslim activism that reflects the famous Arabic proverb, “kalimatu haqq urida biha baṭil”. That is, it is possible to “use the word of truth to serve a false or harmful purpose.” Navigating this for the MBC will be a challenge.

In his inaugural speech, Dr Akhter emphasised engaging with critics constructively, rejecting victimhood narratives in favour of proactive narratives. However, ongoing blanket condemnation of the Conservative Party, for example, continues to undermine that very ethos. Publicly airing grievances against the Conservative Party or any party, including Labour, comes across as politically naive and tactically shortsighted. Similarly, using foreign media outlets with a tendency for anti-establishment messaging, only reinforces the wider public’s confirmation bias, especially while simultaneously decrying anti-Muslim bias in the mainstream British press.

If the MCB is serious about constructive vision setting, it must apply this principle consistently, even when politically inconvenient. That is the essence of integrity, and in my view, central to what it means to represent Islam and Muslims publicly through God-consciousness. The political right is not going to disappear. And, despite disagreements, it is worth recognising that many values traditionally associated with the right, such as individual responsibility, family, law and order, community, security, and so on, are shared by a large segment of British Muslims coming from a rational and faith-based values perspective. My point is, there is space here for honest, syncretic engagement without compromising principles.

Human psychology is naturally wired to retain negative impressions, and it often takes significant effort to shift public perception. Rather than falling victim to this dynamic, the MCB must more clearly and consistently signal that it has broken from its past. For example, even as recently as the Government’s banning of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the MCB remained conspicuously silent. Previously, in 2006, the MCB was against proscription of such groups. But here’s the thing. Such groups have significantly contributed to distorting the public image of Islam and hindered constructive engagement. The MCB’s silence on their proscription risks reinforcing perceptions of ideological ambiguity.

Given this context, the MCB should have publicly welcomed the decision. Failing to do so reflected a broader, recurring problem: the organisation still struggles to demonstrate that it has moved beyond the perception of Islamist leanings. I know the MCB is not radical nor Islamist; it is, in fact, politically moderate, with a clear left-leaning bias as normal to the tapestry of British politics. But, paradoxically, it is precisely because the MCB’s thinking is not grounded in Islamic intellectual tradition that it struggles to calibrate this political leaning in a principled and effective way. The irony, therefore, is that the absence of a well-thought-out Islamic framework feeds into the very misperceptions the MCB seeks to avoid.

Advice 3: Develop greater perspective – situate challenges like housing and education within a broader societal context to build solidarity.

Muslim issues like housing, health inequality, education, opportunities etc. are not just Muslim issues, but wider social issues that can affect all Britons. The fact that they may disproportionately affect British Muslims can be related to structural economic and class issues, and not of faith-based discrimination. For example, deprivation in the North East of England may have roots in the post-industrial shift (closure of textiles industry etc.) and lack of subsequent economic regeneration. In highlighting this issue, the MCB’s instinct to insulate issues as “Muslim” risks reinforcing views of otherness towards them; the reality is far more nuanced and less tribalistic. Instead, the focus should be wider society-first, with a secondary focus on the disproportionate impacts on others, such as British Muslim or working-class white populations. Again, it’s about how the MCB frames their messaging.

There is also a more fundamental issue which may explain why the MCB resorts to an insulated Muslim framing. Has the MCB meaningfully engaged with the many reports and studies on socio-economic disparities, on social cohesion, integration, and so on, in Britain? Is the MCB aware of the growing intergenerational gaps that contribute to real social and communal challenges? For instance, the “first-generation-in-every-generation” effect, as highlighted by Dame Louise Casey many years ago, continues to distort how different Muslim socio-economic groups are treated and understood. Today, we have a highly successful and growing second- and third-generation British Muslim middle class whose cultural outlook and lived experiences are quite different to the relatively recent arrivals, such as students or Muslim migrants from EU countries before Brexit. Is the MCB aware of the social dynamics both intra- and inter-community this creates?

The MCB should embrace perspectivism to move beyond a narrow “Muslim-only problem” framing, which too often presents a singular narrative of Muslim marginalisation. Instead, it should engage more honestly with the internal diversity of the British Muslim experience, acknowledging class disparities, generational tensions, and differing political priorities. This shift would not only make the MCB more representative and rooted in the lived realities of British Muslims but also enhance its credibility when speaking on national platforms. A balanced approach that recognises both challenges and success stories rather than focusing solely on problems/issues avoids the pitfalls of a “glass-half-empty” mindset. By adopting this more nuanced and self-reflective stance, the MCB will be better positioned to offer insights into inequality and exclusion that resonate with wider society and become less demoralising within the British Muslim, too. Crucially, it would also help others see the MCB not as separate or oppositional, but as part of the broader national conversation.

Advice 4: Build institutional problem-solving capability

The MCB must understand that merely collecting views from its affiliates does not constitute effective problem solving. When it comes to Muslims talking about Muslim identity in the public sphere, I find that widespread emotion, populism, bias, lack of realism, and groupthink often cloud sound analysis and judgment. I therefore think it is essential for the MCB to go beyond surface-level feedback and emotion and apply rigorous, structured problem-solving methods.

For example, feedback or perceived problems should be broken down into their constituent parts until all relevant aspects of an issue are captured in their reduced forms without overlaps or gaps between them. This is a first step. If the MCB or its affiliates propose solutions based on experience or expertise, they must test underlying assumptions to see how rooted they are in godliness, ethics, evidence and the British context. While affiliates may feel they understand the context well, I often find that ingrained biases and groupthink cloud their analysis. What also doesn’t help is the lack of a deeper understanding of how Islam works, which often means that people take uninformed positions before a proper theological consideration. These challenges often result in narrow or “blinkered” views.

So, a good starting point for problem-solving might include:

“What are the core challenges facing British Muslims?” which can be broken down logically into population segments, root causes and sub-issues.
A hypothesis like “British Muslims can be a force for good in society” and then explore reasons why this might be true or where barriers exist.
“How can British Muslims improve their image in the media?” and then disaggregate into discrete issues and actionable steps.

There are many analytical tools the MCB could use to approach these questions, such as fault tree analysis, which can help trace ineffective outcomes back to root causes. This approach can help differentiate:

Proximate causes (e.g., “We are out of favour with the establishment”) that are too far removed or too late to address.
Uncontrollable externalities (e.g. “The political right is hostile”).
Manageable internal issues (e.g. “The MCB lacks unbiased perspectives”).

Feedback should be analysed with a critical eye. Common pitfalls to avoid include:

Confirmation bias (e.g. “They did something bad one day, and now someone said they’re bad, so they must be bad”);
Overcomplicating or under-scoping issues (e.g. bringing everything into a scope of racism or anti-Muslim hatred, anti-immigration sentiment etc.);
Choosing unsuitable analytic methods (taking opinions of people as fact and evidence in and of itself);
Failing to account for confounding variables (e.g. social phenomena are complex with highly overlapping impacts, dependencies and influences);
And taking on more than the MCB can realistically deliver (e.g. there’s only so much the MCB can realistically deliver given constraints in budget, capability and right to play etc.).

In every research or engagement effort, the MCB must consistently ask the “So what?” question to ensure insights are actionable and strategically relevant. To make the MCB’s “Townhall” engagements effective, there also needs to be a synthesis exercise checking for coherence, testing assumptions, and sharpening the way things are articulated. This means stepping back, refining conclusions, testing insights, and iterating where needed.

Once problems/issues are structured, the MCB must develop a work plan that aligns with that structure. It should also recognise that not all problems are worth taking on, especially given inevitable constraints in budget, time, and capability. Without a realistic appraisal of what is feasible, the MCB risks, unintentionally, adding to problems rather than helping to solve them.

To meet the complexity of the challenges ahead, the MCB must build or source high-quality problem-solving capability, whether internally or through independent expertise. Without this, the organisation risks repeating past missteps and missing the opportunity to add value.

Advice 5: Deepen religious literacy fit for public engagement

I’ve long observed that the MCB appears largely disconnected from Islamic intellectual and spiritual tradition in its public engagement. A striking example of this was its 2018 publication, “Our Shared British Future,” in which the first mention of God appears only on page 114 of a 130-page report. While this may seem like a small detail, it is symptomatic of a much deeper issue.

One must ask: would the MCB’s approach to public engagement look any different if it was informed by a more grounded Islamic intellectual framework, one rooted in a realism, pragmatism, human psychology, fiqh al-aqaliyyat (jurisprudence for Muslim minorities), concepts like “Islamic secular” (Dr Sherman Jackson) or the Prophetic principle of compassion and gentleness even toward those who oppose or differ vehemently? God says, “Repel with that which is better and the one between whom and you there is enmity will be as if he were a close friend” (41:35).

Does the MCB seriously engage with the Qur’an, Prophetic examples, or modern theological reasoning (e.g. contemporary kalam) to develop a coherent and principled approach to public discourse? The core challenge remains: how can the MCB evolve beyond its current posture of grievance and move away from, as many see from the outside, an adversarial, unnuanced, and self-important mode of engagement? Without a deeper intellectual and spiritual recalibration, it risks remaining more reactive than constructive, and more political than principled and balanced.

The MCB has a long track record of being on the wrong side of key moments of change. As previously mentioned, it has resisted proscription of radical Islamist groups in the past. More recently, the MCB supported the APPG on British Muslims’ definition of Islamophobia. But the definition was deeply problematic. The definition was not only legally unworkable but also raised serious concerns around freedom of speech. In the Islamic paradigm, both are key considerations of public interest and law. More obviously, where the MCB should have picked up but didn’t was how the definition racialised Muslims, secularised the concept of Muslimness, and overlooked the central role of godliness in Islamic identity. This oversight reflected a deeper disconnect between the MCB’s public positioning and the theological and spiritual core of Islam. Even more recently, a communications misstep saw the MCB publish a fabricated Qur’anic verse generated by AI, an error they later acknowledged and apologised for.

While these may seem minor to many, they expose deeper institutional issues. Namely, a lack of rigorous engagement with Islamic tradition and insufficient theological literacy among those leading or representing the organisation. Moreover, the scholars affiliated with the MCB seldom speak publicly against wrongdoing within Muslim communities or the theological considerations of how Muslim communities should aim to develop Islam in the UK, bringing in concepts of contextualising Islam to the British Isles, fiqh al-aqaliyyat and so on. This reluctance falls short of the standards of principled, discerning scholarship: that leadership of Muslims and organisations that actively identify through their faith is much more in need of than most Muslims perhaps realise.

**Advice 6: Commit to reform (islah) of Muslim communities**

I’ve been careful to use the Arabic term islah to denote what I mean by “reform.” An islahi discourse is about rectifying things that are out of place, stagnant or wrong based on an understanding of Islam, it’s universal principles, God’s revelation, prophetic virtues, moral accountability, social context, and so on. At its heart, islah begins with the self. The Qur’anic tradition emphasises muhasabah (critical self-accounting) and muraqabah (the spiritual awareness that God is ever-watchful), as essential acts of inward reform that lead to meaningful external change. This requires deep literacy in Islam, knowledge of God (ma’arifah), theology (kalam), jurisprudence (fiqh), legal theory (usul), spiritual purification (tasawwuf/tazkiyah), hadith, seerah, history, and so on.

Once one begins to immerse oneself in this body of knowledge, it becomes clear that many dominant narratives within British Muslim communities need re-examination, re-framing, and re-grounding. For example:

Contextualising Islam within the social fabric of the British Isles.
Developing a nuanced, God-centred political theology suited for Muslims as both citizens and moral agents in a pluralistic society.
Unpacking the ethnocentric legacy of South Asian Islam that has long shaped, and, as I argued at length in 2019, constrained, British Muslim institutional life.

The issue is that the MCB does not meaningfully engage in this type of work. Its forays into communal reform are infrequent, and when they do occur, as in Dr Akhter’s recent public criticism of a mosque for turning away girls who came to break their fast, they appear reactionary and ad hoc. Such interventions lack the scaffolding of a sustained, strategic framework for community development. They generate headlines but not direction, psychological safety and change. This ad hoc approach raises a deeper concern: is the MCB genuinely committed to principled reform (islah), or is it simply echoing the views of its affiliates without critical reflection or deeper vision?

On balance, I think the MCB are interested in islah, but the structure of thought and the theory of change behind it is missing. Even in the area of mosque reform, where it has driven significant initiatives, the impact it is having is far too slow. While it has driven conversations around inclusivity, safety, and transparency, these initiatives often remain surface-level. They rarely grapple with the deeper spiritual malaise, the generational disconnection, or the lack of visionary leadership that plagues many community institutions. The pace of reform is slow, not just because of Muslims resisting change, but because there is no deep-rooted movement to build local leadership, form hearts, and inspire communities from within. The MCB currently lacks a clear theory of change and strong intellectual foundations. Its initiatives often feel technocratic rather than transformational. To make things worse, there is little spiritual, ethical, intellectual “big picture” anchor in almost all work that the MCB does, including in the mosque reform drive.

Without a serious internal investment in Islamic learning, critical self-reflection, and principled leadership, its ambitions for “Vision 2050” will remain performative rather than transformative. But, as I outlined in 2019, there are actually three things Muslim communities need: reputable institutions, standards and platforms. The MCB could do a lot to foster such improvement. This kind of improvement work will bear fruit with how British Muslims are perceived in the wider society. Simply challenging freedom of expression and the press will not win hearts and minds of those who today might write disparagingly about British Muslims.

One of the most significant structural challenges facing the MCB is its very nature as a representative body. By design, it is obligated to reflect the views, priorities, and sensibilities of its affiliates. While this is consistent with democratic accountability, in practice it means that the MCB is often disproportionately influenced by the loudest voices or the most financially powerful affiliate within its network. This creates an internal dynamic where strategic decisions and public positions may be shaped more by appeasing dominant interests than by principled or visionary leadership.

Such a setup inevitably constrains the MCB’s ability to adopt and promote an islaḥi discourse, one that may challenge prevailing assumptions, speak hard truths, or push for introspective transformation within the British Muslim community. When representative legitimacy becomes tethered to institutional appeasement rather than prophetic moral courage, the independence and islahi potential of the MCB are severely compromised. For the MCB to lead with integrity and relevance, it must find ways to balance its representative duties with a deeper commitment to principled, critical engagement, even when that means resisting pressure from influential affiliates.

Concluding remarks

I always encourage organisations to reflect on the opportunity cost of their current activities, not just what they’re doing, but what they could be doing better, on a larger scale, or with greater impact and quality. This requires operating from a mindset of continuous learning and reflection. Too often, when organisations are told to “focus on impact,” this becomes narrowly interpreted as a push for scale: more events, bigger audiences, higher numbers. But this numbers-driven approach can shift focus away from purpose and depth, making scale and visibility the primary problems to solve. In doing so, organisations risk falling into the trap of modernity’s obsession with metrics, rather than prioritising substance and meaning. Yet it is quality, not quantity, that we need first and foremost, and indeed, it is excellence in quality that God commands from us.

What the MCB needs to do is not simply a matter of tone, but of purpose. If the MCB can reorient itself around wisdom, critical thoughts and be properly solution-orientated befitting of a representative body, it could serve as a trusted partner in public life. The organisation does not need to be everything to everyone, but it must represent the best of British Islam: principled, reflective, and future-focused.

I know things are challenging for the MCB, after years of being sidelined and maligned by many. The current leadership is also picking up past baggage and failure. Given limitations of limited budget, being volunteer-led and marginalisation, the MCB to perform at a high standard will take time. Nevertheless, the advice I have provided above should be seen as an honest and objective assessment of what the MCB should be thinking about and doing. I believe the MCB still has the potential to play a vital role in cultivating British Muslim public life, but only if it embraces deep, strategic reform rooted in critical thought, integrity, and professionalism. This is a call not to abandon the MCB, but to challenge it to become what it claims to represent. If it fails, then it would be time to replace it with something better.

May God grant us the clarity to discern what is virtuous, and the courage to pursue it with integrity.